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Financial openness is often associated with higher rates of economic growth. We show that the impact
of openness on factor productivity growth is more important than the effect on capital growth. This
explains why the growth effects of liberalization appear to be largely permanent, not temporary. We
attribute these permanent liberalization effects to the role financial openness plays in stock market
and banking sector development, and to changes in the quality of institutions. We find some indirect
evidence of higher investment efficiency post-liberalization. We also document threshold effects: countries
that are more financially developed or have higher quality of institutions experience larger productivity
growth responses. Finally, we show that the growth boost from openness outweighs the detrimental
loss in growth from global or regional banking crises.
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Recent evidence strongly suggests a link between ¯nancial openness and economic growth.
For example, Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2005) and Quinn and Toyoda (2008) docu-
ment strong growth e®ects. It is true that Rodrik (1998) and Edison, Levine, Ricci, and
Slok (2002) ¯nd weak e®ects and a survey paper by Prasad, Rogo®, Wei, and Kose (2004)
calls the collective evidence \mixed." However, Quinn and Toyoda (2008) convincingly ar-
gue that the weak results are largely driven by measurement error in the ¯nancial openness
variable. The Gupta and Yuan (2009) study at the industry level and the Mitton (2006)
article at the ¯rm level con¯rm the positive growth e®ects of stock market liberalization
and ¯nd them to be stronger than in Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005).
This evidence nevertheless raises many questions. In the standard \neo-classical"
model, a capital market liberalization lowers the cost of capital, thereby inducing addi-
tional investment and a temporary growth response. However, the decrease in the cost
of capital appears rather modest (Bekaert and Harvey (2000), Henry (2000)), and the
associated increase in investment is small relative to the large GDP growth increment
(Henry (2003)). Of course, ¯nancial openness may also directly a®ect factor productivity,
for example, by spurring ¯nancial development, promoting better corporate governance,
or signaling higher quality governments (Rajan and Zingales (2003)). Gourinchas and
Jeanne (2006) argue that examining the productivity e®ects of international ¯nancial in-
tegration is far more important than considering its investment growth e®ects, as the
latter have little chance of helping developing countries close the development gap. This
is what we set out to do in this article.
Our ¯rst task is to decompose the per capita output growth e®ect into two channels:
changes in factor productivity and investment growth. We ¯nd that factor productivity
is the more important channel. The article thereby ¯lls a large gap in the literature
regarding the determinants of factor productivity growth. Much of the extant literature
focuses on the bene¯cial e®ects of ¯nancial development, but part of that link may really
be due to ¯nancial openness (see Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad and Siegel (2007) for a related
argument).1 Our results also complement the results in Borenstein et al. (1998), which
1See Jeong and Townsend (2007) who show that total factor productivity growth can come about by
1document that Foreign Direct Investment improves factor productivity. We also examine
directly what part of the growth response is temporary and what part is permanent. To
shed more light on the sources of the permanent e®ect, we examine the e®ects of ¯nancial
liberalization on future ¯nancial development and the quality of institutions. We ¯nd
that ¯nancial openness enhances the development and e±ciency of the stock market, the
quality of institutions, and macroeconomic policies, but the results are not fully robust
across speci¯cations.
A simple mechanism for ¯nancial openness to a®ect productivity is that it improves
domestic allocative e±ciency. For example, in Obstfeld's (1994) model, openness allows
countries to more e±ciently share risk and invest in the higher return, riskier projects.
Again, the existing literature has focused on ¯nancial development, see e.g. Fisman and
Love (2004) and Wurgler (2000), but not on ¯nancial openness. Galindo, Schianterelli
and Weiss (2007) show that domestic ¯nancial liberalization improves the e±ciency of
investment allocation. Our results suggest that investment is more sensitive to global
growth opportunities in countries that are open to foreign investors. We are able to
generalize the results in, for instance, Chari and Henry (2008), who show that ¯rm-speci¯c
investment in a sample of ¯ve countries is correlated with changes in growth opportunities
after stock market liberalization.
We then go on to conduct an extensive interaction analysis examining what local con-
ditions lead to the largest investment growth and/or factor productivity growth responses.
This evidence provides a new perspective on the existing work on the threshold e®ects in
the relation between ¯nancial integration and growth (see Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad
(2001, 2005), Edwards (2001), Klein (2003), Prasad et al. (2004)). We ¯nd that both
¯nancial development and the quality of institutions produce positive interaction e®ects.
Finally, one often hears the argument that globalization makes countries more suscep-
tible to ¯nancial crises.2 We therefore directly examine the interaction between crises and
¯nancial liberalization. Ranciere, Tornell, and Westermann (2008) argue that a banking
¯nancial deepening and an expansion of credit (using data from Thailand); Hsieh and Klenow (2009)
who provide micro evidence on capital mis-allocation in China and India relative to the U.S.; Levine and
Zervos (1998) who show that stock market development improves factor productivity; and Peress (2008)
who proposes a model that links ¯nancial development and technological progress.
2See, for instance, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999).
2and currency crisis, such as the Asian crisis in 1997, may be the price to pay for the longer-
term bene¯ts of ¯nancial openness. We ¯nd that ¯nancial openness does not signi¯cantly
increase the incidence of crises and that the output loss of a crisis is far outweighed by
the output gain of ¯nancial liberalization.
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section, we introduce the data and
the econometric methods used in the study. We then present evidence on the link between
¯nancial openness and economic growth, decomposing the growth e®ect into investment
growth and factor productivity in Section 3. Section 4 investigates threshold e®ects. Sec-
tion 5 focuses on the interaction between crises and ¯nancial openness. Some concluding
remarks are o®ered in the ¯nal section.
2 Output Growth and Financial Liberalization
2.1 Data
Our data, spanning the 1980-2006 period and 96 countries, are drawn from a number of
sources detailed in the Appendix. While most variables do not require further explanation
here, it is important to account for how we measure capital stock and factor productivity
growth. The growth in the capital stock is equal to aggregate real investment less de-
preciation in the capital stock divided by the previous year's capital stock. We build per
capita physical capital stocks using the method described in King and Levine (1993). We
derive an initial estimate of the capital stock for 1960, assuming each country is at its
steady state capital-output ratio at that time. Then, we use the aggregate real investment
series and the perpetual inventory method with a depreciation rate of 7% to compute the
capital stock in later years. Total factor productivity growth is constructed as in Beck,
Levine, and Loayza (2000). Assuming a capital share of 0.3 for all countries, we calculate
productivity growth as the di®erence between the GDP growth rate and 0.3 times the
capital stock growth rate.
We employ several measures of ¯nancial openness. First, our capital market openness
variable uses data from the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangement and Exchange
Restrictions. There are six categories of restrictions. If any restriction is in place, the
standard indicator takes a value of zero suggesting the capital account is closed. Because
3of its coarseness, this variable has been discredited in the literature, see e.g. Eichengreen
(2001). We instead employ Quinn's (1997) measure of capital account openness (see also
Quinn and Toyoda (2008)). While relying on the same IMF data, Quinn scores each of
these restrictions, separately for capital payments and receipts, on a scale of 0 to 2 (0.5
increments), and then adds the two. Quinn's system investigates the need for o±cial
approval, the likelihood it is granted, and the presence of taxes. It therefore measures the
degree to which the capital account is open. The measure is available for 78 of our 96
countries.
Second, to measure equity market openness, we use the o±cial ¯nancial openness mea-
sure based on Bekaert and Harvey's (2005) Chronology of Important Economic, Financial
and Political Events in Emerging Markets. The o±cial liberalization measure is an indi-
cator variable that takes the value of one once a country allows foreigners to transact in
the local equity market. The o±cial equity market liberalization variable is available for
all 96 countries.
Last, we consider an additional measure of equity market openness, proposed by
Bekaert (1995) and Edison and Warnock (2003), to explore the robustness of our mea-
sured e®ects to the dating of ¯nancial liberalization. The equity market openness measure
is a continuous variable that re°ects the ratio of market capitalization available to foreign
investors divided by the total market capitalization of all domestically listed ¯rms. For
this measure, a value of zero means the market is segmented to foreigners and a value of
one means that the entire market capitalization is available to foreign investors.
2.2 Econometric framework
De¯ne yi;t as the log growth rate in per capita real GDP, capital stock, or total factor






yi;t+j i = 1;:::;N (1)
where N is the number of countries in our sample. Our main panel regression is speci¯ed
as:
yi;t+5;t = ¯Qi;start + °
0Xi;t + ®Libi;t + ²i;t+5;5 (2)
4where Qi;start represents the logarithm of initial per capita real GDP, reset at 5-year inter-
vals (1980, 1985, etc.). In the standard neo-classical framework, the Xi;t variables control
for steady state per capita GDP levels, which may di®er across countries. The Qi;start
variable functions as initial GDP and ¯ is the conditional convergence coe±cient which is
expected to be negative. When steady-state GDP is raised (e.g. through policy reforms)
above initial GDP, the country will converge towards the higher per capita GDP level.
To maximize the time-series content in our regression, we use overlapping data. We use
a pooled OLS estimate but the reported standard errors re°ect groupwise heteroskedas-
ticity, SUR e®ects, and a Newey and West (1987) adjustment with four lags for serial
correlation.
There are two neo-classical channels through which liberalization can a®ect growth.
First, the °ow of capital from capital-rich to capital-poor countries lowers the real inter-
est rate in liberalizing countries, increases investment, and spurs growth. Gourinchas and
Jeanne (2006) suggest that many developing countries are not particularly capital scarce
and that this e®ect only leads to faster convergence to a too low steady-state per capita
GDP. Second, the international ¯nance literature suggests that open equity markets re-
duce the equity risk premium because of improved risk sharing. This intuition goes back
to Errunza and Losq (1985) and was tested in Bekaert and Harvey (2000) and Henry
(2000). As the cost of capital decreases, more investment projects should have positive
net present value. This should spur investment that is ¯nanced either locally or by foreign
capital. The increased investment leads to increased output growth. From the perspective
of the neo-classical model, this improved risk sharing and foreign presence in local capital
markets is bound to raise the steady state level of GDP. If this is the case, accounting
for ¯nancial openness should imply that the regression framework should control for the
true steady state GDP and the convergence coe±cient should increase, a hypothesis we
test below. Nevertheless, the growth spurt remains temporary within the neo-classical
framework.
One standard critique of a regression framework such as equation (2) is the possibility
of reverse causality: countries liberalize exactly because they are experiencing favorable
growth opportunities. This criticism is largely unfounded. First, it is simply implausi-
ble that governments would correctly identify such favorable growth opportunities and
5perfectly time the liberalization accordingly. Research on the causes of ¯nancial liberal-
ization (see e.g. Quinn and Inclan (1997)) mostly ¯nd that they are entirely politically
driven.3 Second, Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005) control for growth opportuni-
ties by adding an exogenous growth opportunity measure to the growth regressions. The
measure employs global price earnings ratios to capture the growth opportunities of the
industry mix in which the liberalizing country specializes. Our results, later reported in
Tables 1 and 2, remain robust to the addition of this growth opportunities measure.4
3 Decomposing the growth e®ect of ¯nancial liberalization
3.1 The decomposition
Table 1 presents the impact of both capital account openness and o±cial equity mar-
ket liberalization on real per capita GDP, capital stock, and total factor productivity
growth. Each regression includes year indicator variables (though these coe±cients are
not reported). We include, in addition to initial per capita GDP, four standard control
variables: a human capital measure (secondary school enrollment), the logarithm of life
expectancy (health care), trade openness (exports plus imports divided by GDP), and
private credit to GDP (¯nancial development). Note that our factor productivity growth
measure does not account for human capital accumulation. Including human capital as
an independent variable is therefore particularly important.
We begin with an exploration of the GDP growth e®ects in the left most column of
each group in Table 1. While we concentrate our discussion on the coe±cients associated
with the ¯nancial openness variables, the signs on the other coe±cients are consistent
with the previous literature (see Barro (1997a,b) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995)).
The coe±cients on initial GDP are negative and highly signi¯cant, which is precisely what
one would expect from a conditional convergence interpretation. The coe±cients for all
the other variables have the expected sign and are also statistically signi¯cant. Turning
3These concerns are therefore much more valid when de facto, as opposed to de jure, ¯nancial inte-
gration is considered: capital may °ow to \productive" countries.
4We do not report the results to conserve space and because the use of the measure severely restricts
our sample of countries.
6to ¯nancial openness, the coe±cients on capital market and equity market openness are
1.50% and 0.98%, respectively. Both coe±cients are highly statistically signi¯cant. This
result may be surprising to some given the fact that some well-publicized articles, such
as Rodrik (1998), have found no growth e®ect associated with general capital account
openness. However, as both Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2005) and Quinn and Toyoda
(2008) discuss, Rodrik's result re°ects the use of the IMF indicator, which is too coarse
to be a meaningful gauge of the degree of capital market openness. Table 1 helps resolve
the mixed evidence regarding the growth e®ects of ¯nancial openness reported by survey
articles. These surveys give undue weight to empirical studies which use a problematic
measure of ¯nancial openness.
Table 1 also shows the capital stock and factor productivity growth e®ects in the two
other sets of columns. We ¯nd that capital stock growth is signi¯cantly associated with
both capital account openness and equity market liberalization, even in the presence of a
banking development variable (private credit divided by GDP). In both sets of regressions,
banking development itself is positively and signi¯cantly associated with higher capital
stock growth. These results are inconsistent with the results in Beck, Levine and Loayza
(2000), who fail to ¯nd a direct e®ect of ¯nancial development on capital stock growth.
Our results also resolve the critique provided by Henry (2003), who appeals to the
neo-classical growth model to argue that the GDP growth e®ects of ¯nancial openness
are `too big.' To review the argument, consider the Solow (1956) growth model:
¢(Y=L) = ¢A + ®¢(K=L) (3)
where ¢(Y=L) is the change in the output per worker, ¢(K=L) is the growth in the
capital stock per worker, ¢A is the change in total factor productivity and ® is the
growth elasticity to capital inputs, re°ecting the capital share in output. Using a standard
estimate for ® equal to 0.3, the model implies that a capital stock growth e®ect of 1.2
to 1.7% implies a \neo-classical" growth e®ect of 35 to 50 basis points across the two
regressions.
Henry (2003) concludes that the growth e®ects of equity market liberalization reported
in Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2005) are too large and must be due to measurement
error in the liberalization e®ect. He suggests that the e®ect is likely due to equity market
7liberalization being correlated with other reforms, such as trade liberalization. However,
such a conclusion seems premature. First, Table 1 controls for trade openness in the
growth regression. Second, when we consider an alternative regression in which we replace
trade openness with the trade liberalization dates reported in Wacziarg and Welch (2008),
we ¯nd similar results.5 Third, and most importantly, it is reasonable to expect that
¯nancial openness raises factor productivity. This would be re°ected in ¢A, the change
in total factor productivity. Given that the closing of the development gap requires
signi¯cant improvements in factor productivity (see Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006)), it is
important to test the link between factor productivity and liberalization directly. The
remaining columns in Table 1 con¯rm that the e®ects of capital account openness and
equity market liberalization on factor productivity growth are indeed both large and
statistically signi¯cant. Decomposing the measured GDP growth e®ect into the capital
stock and total factor productivity growth e®ects, nearly two-thirds of the overall GDP
growth e®ect is attributable to total factor productivity for both measures of ¯nancial
openness. Our results suggest that factor productivity cannot be ignored when examining
¯nancial openness and growth.
In Table 2, we explore the robustness of the ¯nancial openness e®ects on GDP, capital
stock, and total factor productivity growth. In the ¯rst two regressions, we examine
the implications of introducing country-¯xed e®ects (the ¯xed e®ects themselves are not
reported to conserve space). Here, we also include a contemporaneous measure of world
GDP growth to control for temporal e®ects, but do not include other control variables.6 In
both cases, the ¯nancial openness e®ects remain large and statistically signi¯cant. Again,
the bulk of the e®ect is due to factor productivity gains, and indeed the decomposition
provides evidence in favor of a factor productivity channel that is even stronger when
country ¯xed e®ects are included. In the last two regressions reported in Table 2, we
5In the presence of Wacziarg and Welch's trade liberalization indicator, the capital account and equity
openness e®ects are somewhat smaller, but are still near 1% per annum and highly statistically signi¯cant.
The trade liberalization e®ect itself is statistically signi¯cant and around 50 to 70 basis points per annum
in magnitude for GDP, capital stock, or total factor productivity growth.
6For our full 96 country sample, the inclusion of both country and time indicators leads to a poorly
behaved variance-covariance matrix given the dimensionality of the system. For this reason, we employ
instead World GDP growth as an alternative control variable for temporal e®ects.
8report the results for our alternative measure of equity market openness discussed above.
The ¯rst regression repeats the country-¯xed e®ect speci¯cation and the second regression
repeats the speci¯cation including the standard control variable set employed in Table
1. The results, quite similar to but somewhat weaker than the o±cial equity market
liberalization e®ects, buttress the argument that there exists an important e®ect for equity
market liberalization on growth, particularly for total factor productivity. To conserve
space, we do not employ this alternative ¯nancial openness variable further.
3.2 Exploring the neo-classical channels
In the neo-classical model, ¯nancial integration does not generate a permanent growth
e®ect. With data extending beyond 2000 and many liberalizations occurring in the late
1980s and early 1990s, we are now able to investigate this implication of the model directly.
Table 3 presents results where we break up the ¯nancial liberalization e®ects into two
pieces: years 1 through 5, and years 6 and beyond. We explore these e®ects for both
capital account and equity market liberalization. While the equity market liberalization
date is known, the date of capital account liberalization is not. To identify the capital
account liberalization date, we de¯ne a liberalization event as an upward increment of 0.2
or larger in Quinn's openness measure that results in the measure then exceeding 0.5. For
both sets of liberalization dates, fully open countries are associated with the permanent
e®ect as they are indeed open, by de¯nition, and have been so for some time.7 Closed
countries are associated with neither a temporary nor a permanent e®ect, and receive a
zero.
We report the temporary and permanent e®ects with both standard controls as em-
ployed in Table 1 and an alternative speci¯cation that includes country ¯xed e®ects as in
Table 2. Across all four speci¯cations, the GDP growth results suggest that the ¯nancial
7We also consider an alternative speci¯cation that includes only liberalizing countries. That is, coun-
tries that undergo the liberalization described above in our sample. The magnitudes and signi¯cance
levels of the temporary e®ects are similar to that reported in Table 3. While the magnitudes of the
permanent e®ects are similar to that reported in Table 3, the signi¯cance levels are somewhat less pro-
nounced. This is perhaps not surprising since the inclusion of the fully open markets provides additional
information about the magnitude of the long-run e®ect.
9liberalization e®ect, either the general capital account or the speci¯c equity market, is
not a purely temporary phenomenon. The coe±cients on the variable representing years
6 and beyond, denoted the permanent e®ect, is always positive and signi¯cantly di®erent
from zero. The e®ects for capital stock growth are not uniformly signi¯cant across every
speci¯cation. Somewhat surprisingly, the temporary capital stock growth e®ect is not
uniformly stronger than the permanent e®ect, but it is for equity market liberalization
where identifying permanent and temporary liberalization e®ects is easier. The perma-
nent factor productivity growth e®ect is statistically signi¯cant in every case, ranging
between 49 and 147 basis points per annum.
Another implication of the neo-classical model is that controlling for liberalization
should entail a larger conditional convergence coe±cient (in absolute terms). That is, once
we control for the e®ect of ¯nancial openness on steady-state per capita GDP, we should
observe stronger conditional convergence (the coe±cient on the initial GDP level). This
is indeed what we ¯nd. To provide a sense of the evidence, the convergence coe±cient is
-0.0107 for a speci¯cation without capital account liberalization that is otherwise identical
to one we report in Table 1. The conditional convergence coe±cient reported in Table 1
is -0.0136, substantially larger in absolute magnitude. The di®erence is signi¯cant at the
5% level, suggesting the inclusion of the capital account openness measure is associated
with stronger conditional convergence everything else equal. We observe similar e®ects
for our equity market openness variables.
3.3 Sources of improved factor productivity
In this section, we examine a number of di®erent channels through which ¯nancial open-
ness may a®ect factor productivity. We focus primarily on two generally accepted sources
of long-term growth: ¯nancial development (Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000)) and in-
stitutional quality (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001)). We also investigate some
proxies for the quality of macro-economic policies, but these may be correlated with in-
stitutional quality.
First, the presence of foreign investors may directly spur ¯nancial development. For
instance, foreign investor access can improve equity market liquidity and price e±ciency.
To explore this, we investigate the ¯nancial openness e®ects on two standard measures
10of stock market liquidity/development, namely the liquidity measure based on zero daily
returns used in Lesmond (2005) and Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2007) and equity
market turnover. For general stock market development, we also consider the ratio of
market capitalization to GDP. Finally, we use the average R2 of a domestic market model
over individual stocks within each stock market, which Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000)
(MYY) claim is inversely associated with price e±ciency (the higher the R2, the less
e±cient the market is as it incorporates less ¯rm-speci¯c information). Financial openness
may also e®ect banking sector development. For example, openness may go hand in hand
with increased foreign ownership of domestic banks, which can entail increased access
to international ¯nancial markets, technological spillovers, increased competition, and
improved regulatory oversight. Our measure for banking development is the standard
ratio of private credit to GDP.
Foreign investors may also directly demand better corporate governance, and have
associated disciplining e®ect on governments. The cost of bad government actions may
be more severe when foreign investors are likely to leave following policy actions that
hamper investments and growth. Conversely, capital controls can provide a screen be-
hind which the government can channel resources to \favored" ¯rms and hence, distort
resource allocation. Johnson and Mitton (2003) show how the imposition of capital con-
trols in 1998 increased cronyism in Malaysia. To investigate whether ¯nancial openness
improves the quality of institutions, we rely primarily on data from the International
Country Risk Guide (see Appendix), a country risk-rating agency. We investigate three
measures. First, \investment pro¯le" measures the general attractiveness of a country for
foreign investment and FDI by scoring contract viability, payment delays, and ability to
repatriate capital. It is one sub-category from the ICRG's composite political risk rating.
Second, we also use the ICRG's \law and order" rating, which is perhaps most directly
related to corporate governance. We also merge three components of the political risk
rating, \law and order", \bureaucratic quality," and \corruption" into one \quality of
institutions" measure. Finally, we consider the economic rating from ICRG, as a mea-
sure of the quality of macroeconomic policies. The measure is outcome-based, combining
statistics on economic levels and growth, in°ation, and ¯scal and trade balances. To
check robustness, we also use Institutional Investor's country credit ratings. For all these
11measures, substantial panel data are available.
The regressions we run are predictive; that is, for the independent variable (a develop-
ment indicator), we use ¯ve-year averages between t and t+5. The potential determinants,
including liberalization, are measured at time t. These regressions face a number of chal-
lenges. First, the independent variables are very persistent, so we include the lagged
dependent variable in each speci¯cation. Second, we include time e®ects to potentially
control for a general trend towards ¯nancial and institutional development. For some of
the variables, we lose a number of countries so that time e®ects do exhaust many degrees
of freedom. We therefore also comment on an alternative speci¯cation replacing time ef-
fects by one control variable, world GDP growth. The ¯rst speci¯cation, including these
two sets of controls, is reported in the left-hand side of Table 4.
The speci¯cation reported on the right adds a control variable that should assuage
concerns about reverse casuality and simultaneity. Liberalization may happen in countries
with better developed ¯nancial systems and institutions or coincide with reforms directly
targeting domestic ¯nancial development and institutions. Given that we do not have
detailed information on reforms, we employ a panel probit on the openness variables,
linking them contemporaneously to private credit to GDP, trade to GDP, ICRG's political
risk index, and the log of the country credit rating. The o±cial equity market liberalization
is a 0/1 variable already, and we also use the 0/1 capital account liberalization variable
constructed above from Quinn's measure. In both versions of the probit speci¯cation, we
¯nd positive signi¯cant coe±cients for all four variables, suggesting that the probability of
¯nancial openness is indeed directly related to other reforms. We then use the estimated
probit to compute a \probability of liberalization" for each country at each point in time,
and use that as an additional control variable. Hence, the coe±cient on liberalization in
the right-hand side of Table 4 can now be interpreted as the e®ect of the \exogenous"
component of liberalization, not linked to pure cross-sectional di®erences in current levels
of development or institutional quality.
In addition, we have run (but do not report) regressions including a measure of ex-
ogenous growth opportunities available to each country constructed in Bekaert, Harvey,
Lundblad, and Siegel (2007). This control variable under-cuts the critique of the liber-
alization being timed to take advantage of unusually favorable growth opportunities (see
12Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005) for a lengthy discussion). The latter speci¯cation
employs a smaller set of countries given limitations on the growth opportunities variable,
but yields qualitatively similar results to the speci¯cations reported in Table 4.
We now discuss the results in Table 4. The asterisks on the coe±cients in Table 4
indicate that the variable in question is signi¯cant at the 5% level in a more parsimonious
speci¯cation where the time e®ects are replaced by world GDP growth. First, ¯nancial
openness improves stock market liquidity, as measured by the drop in average zero daily
returns. The coe±cients across all speci¯cations are negative but lack strong statistical
signi¯cance. However, they become highly signi¯cant when world GDP growth replaces
time e®ects. This is true for almost all the stock market development measures. Given it
is conceivable that there is a general trend towards better developed markets, not neces-
sarily associated with liberalization, we should be cautious in interpreting these results.
The ¯nancial openness e®ect on turnover is positive as expected, but loses statistical sig-
ni¯cance once we focus on the exogenous component of the liberalization. The size of
the stock market (measured as the stock market capitalization to GDP ratio) also in-
creases but not signi¯cantly, and once \endogenous" liberalization is controlled for, the
e®ect weakens further. The MYY e±ciency measure deteriorates after ¯nancial openness.
While the MYY measure should be inversely related to market e±ciency, Gri±n, Kelly,
and Nardari (2007) discuss how time-variation in the MYY measure is sometimes di±cult
to interpret. For example, it is conceivable that the increased common exposure to world
markets, which increases ¯rm betas with respect to the world market (see Bekaert and
Harvey (2000) for concrete evidence), may lead to a higher R2 for ¯rms with respect to
their own market. These results are also inconsistent with the results in Bailey, Bae,
and Mao (2006) who show concretely that ¯nancial openness improves the information
environment. For instance, analyst coverage and value-added by analysts increase with
openness, partly due to the increased presence and activity of foreign analysts.
Turning to banking sector development, ¯nancial openness has a positive and signif-
icant e®ect on private credit to GDP. The results here con¯rm some disparate results
in the literature. Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2001) also found a signi¯cant rela-
tionship between stock market liberalization and ¯nancial development (both banking
and stock market development), and did not ¯nd evidence for the reverse link (that is,
13¯nancial development did not necessarily predict liberalization). Chinn and Ito (2006)
¯nd a link between broad capital market openness and measures of ¯nancial development
in a regression framework that is similar to our ¯rst speci¯cation with some additional
controls.
We now turn to our proposed institutional quality measures. Financial openness does
not have a robust e®ect on our measures of either law and order or the quality of in-
stitutions when the world growth variable is used as a control. However, when we use
time e®ects, the coe±cients are statistically signi¯cant and mostly survive controlling for
\endogenous" liberalization decisions. While not de¯nitive, this does suggest that the
mere presence of foreign investors may have wider bene¯cial e®ects on the institutions
of a country.8 Financial openness also appears to signi¯cantly predict improvements in
the investment pro¯le, which is narrowly associated with law and regulations bene¯tting
FDI. The e®ect disappears for `exogenous' equity liberalization. Finally, ¯nancial open-
ness is robustly and signi¯cantly associated with improved macro-policies using both of
our measures, perhaps re°ecting a disciplining e®ect of foreign investment. The one ex-
ception again is that the e®ect disappears for `exogenous' equity liberalization for the ¯rst
\macro-economic environment" measure.
One interesting hypothesis to help interpret the signi¯cant factor productivity growth
e®ects associated with ¯nancial openness is that ¯nancial openness may be part of a
Great Reversal (Rajan and Zingales, 2003) within countries, leading to generally better
policies and institutions. Our results appear consistent with this hypothesis. We not only
¯nd direct, `exogenous' positive e®ects of ¯nancial openness, but the coe±cients on the
probability of liberalization are typically also signi¯cant, and that variable may indirectly
proxy for simultaneous reforms.
As an additional test, we examine whether factor productivity growth increases through
an improved e±ciency of capital allocation. In the debate about how ¯nancial develop-
8For example, Desai and Moel (2008) discuss a particular case where the government of the Czech
Republic compensated a foreign investment unit following signi¯cant losses associated with poor corporate
governance. More generally, Leuz, Lins, and Warnock (2009) ¯nd that foreigners invest less in ¯rms that
reside in countries with poor outsider protection, disclosure, and governance. Choi, Lee, and Park (2007)
provide a speci¯c example of a foreign-¯nanced activist fund that directly pushes corporate governance
reforms in Korea.
14ment contributes to economic growth, Wurgler (2000) and Fisman and Love (2004)'s
work strongly suggest that ¯nancial development may improve capital allocation. Beck,
Levine and Loayza (2000) demonstrate that factor productivity is positively related to
the exogenous component of ¯nancial development. However, Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad
and Siegel (2007) show that ¯nancial openness helps align exogenously available growth
opportunities (GO) with actual growth, and that ¯nancial openness is more important
than either ¯nancial development or the absence of ¯nancing constraints, stressed by
Rajan and Zingales (1998). The Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad and Siegel (2007) measure
of exogenous growth opportunities essentially uses global price to earnings ratios for the
industries in which a country specializes, and strongly predicts actual GDP growth. We
add depth to their framework to test whether the response of (aggregate) investment
(from t to t + 5) to growth opportunities (measured at time t) is di®erent in ¯nancially
open economies. Hence, we are testing an interaction e®ect: improved domestic alloca-
tive e±ciency would imply that investment growth responds more strongly to growth
opportunities post-liberalization.
Table 5 reports the results. We consider three speci¯cations each for capital account
openness (top panel) and equity liberalization (bottom panel). The speci¯cation on the
left is parsimonious. Our regressors include the GO measure, the ¯nancial openness
measure, and their interaction, in addition to time e®ects. In this regression, we ¯nd
that there is no independent ¯nancial openness e®ect on capital stock growth. Financial
openness primarily serves to make countries respond better to growth opportunities: the
interaction coe±cients are positive and statistically signi¯cant. In the second speci¯cation,
we also control for country ¯xed e®ects. The interaction e®ects remain signi¯cant, but
there is now also an independent e®ect of capital market openness on growth. In the
third speci¯cation, we replace the country ¯xed e®ects by the same initial GDP per
capita measure used in Table 1, and the e®ects remain robust, with now equity openness
also generating independent e®ects. Adding more control variables does not change these
conclusions. Not surprisingly, in all speci¯cations, investment growth in closed countries
fails to respond to the global growth opportunities available to their industries.
As a ¯nal \e±ciency test," we examine whether a particular investment to GDP level
generates more growth in ¯nancially open countries. To do so, we regress ¯ve-year future
15growth on initial GDP per capita, year e®ects, ¯nancial openness and the investment to
GDP ratio, where the latter e®ect is split over \open\ and \closed" countries.9 For capital
account openness, we ¯nd that each percent of investment to GDP leads to a signi¯cantly
larger growth response in open countries. The increase in investment e±ciency is about
the same for equity market openness (on the order of 45 to 50 basis points of growth for
a 20% investment to GDP ratio), but no longer statistically signi¯cant. Detailed results
are available upon request.
4 Threshold e®ects
Liberalization is associated with both capital stock and factor productivity growth. How-
ever, we only measure an average e®ect. It is important to examine the heterogeneity
of the e®ect across di®erent countries. Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005) document
strong threshold e®ects in the overall GDP growth response to equity market liberaliza-
tion. Here we look at the potential for heterogeneity in the e®ects associated with the
individual growth channels. Table 6 presents the analysis of the liberalization e®ects on
capital stock growth and total factor productivity growth separated by country charac-
teristics. Panel A focuses on the capital account openness measure and Panel B on the
o±cial equity market liberalization.
We measure the heterogeneity across countries in the ¯nancial openness e®ect by
breaking up the indicator variable into two pieces:





i;t + ±Chari;t + ²i;t+5;5; (4)
where yi;t+5;t represents either the ¯ve-year capital stock or total factor productivity
growth, Lib
Low
i;t denotes the openness variable for countries that falls below the median
value for certain country characteristics, and Lib
High
i;t is the analogous de¯nition for coun-
tries that fall above the median value. The regression also includes the \own-e®ect" of
the characteristic, which is denoted by Chari;t. We report the coe±cients on the high
and low characteristic indicators as well as a Wald test of the null hypothesis that the
9Because investment to GDP ratios and ¯nancial openness are highly correlated, an interaction analysis
may yield anomalous results.
16coe±cients are not signi¯cantly di®erent from one another. We also report the coe±cient
on the own e®ect.
We consider two categories of interaction variables: ¯nancial sector variables (pri-
vate credit/GDP, equity market turnover, equity market capitalization/GDP, antidirector
rights, and the MYY measure) and quality of institutions variables (the ICRG quality of
institutions measure, the investment pro¯le, law and order, and the country credit rating).
All of these variables are detailed in the appendix.
We focus the discussion on the capital account openness measure. The regressions
suggest signi¯cant heterogeneity in the capital growth regressions with respect to seven
of the eight variables considered. The countries with a `high' level of the characteristic
(better than average ¯nancial development and better quality institutions) have a signif-
icantly higher capital growth response to liberalization than the countries with a `low'
level of the characteristic. For example, the quality of institutions is important for capi-
tal stock growth in both `low' and `high' Quality of Institutions countries. However, the
coe±cient is six times larger for countries that have high quality institutions. While this
is perhaps not surprising, it is de¯nitely conceivable that countries with poor institutions
and ¯nancial development may experience the largest drop in the cost of capital and gen-
erate large investment responses. In six out of eight cases, the direct e®ect is positive and
statistically signi¯cant.
The total factor productivity regressions are also suggestive of heterogeneity; however,
the evidence is somewhat weaker. Similar to the results for capital stock growth, the
coe±cients on the `high' level of the variable are generally greater than the coe±cients
on the `low' level of the variable, and the high-level coe±cients are always statistically
signi¯cant. However, the di®erence between the two coe±cients is now only signi¯cant
in six cases and signi¯cant at the 1% level in only three cases. For example, for Quality
of Institutions, the coe±cient in the `low' countries is not signi¯cantly di®erent from
zero. The coe±cient for the `high' countries is signi¯cant and 11 times greater than the
point estimate for the low countries, but the di®erence is only signi¯cant at the 10%
level. The results in Panel B for equity market liberalization are qualitatively similar, but
statistically slightly weaker.
Our analysis shows that the particular characteristics of a country often determine the
17capital stock and factor productivity response to ¯nancial liberalization. Much more work
is needed to disentangle how such interaction e®ects really arise. Gupta and Yuan (2009)
provide some perspective on the positive interaction e®ect with ¯nancial development for
equity market liberalization using industry data. They ¯nd that liberalization relaxes
¯nancing constraints and stimulates the creation of new ¯rms only in countries that
are relatively well ¯nancially developed. They also provide some direct evidence that
regulatory barriers and institutional frictions prevent certain ¯rms (industries) to take
full advantage of liberalization.
5 Liberalization and Crises
An often-heard critique of ¯nancial liberalization is that it increases the macro-economic
vulnerability of countries and the probability of a ¯nancial crisis (see Stiglitz (2000)). An
extensive literature on the e®ects of liberalization on risk sharing and macro-volatility ¯nds
mixed results (see Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2006), Fratzscher and Imbs (2009),
Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003)), although the bulk of the evidence does not support
a strong increase in real volatility post liberalization. Here, we focus on the interaction
between liberalization and banking sector crises. While such crises may not necessarily
lead to a permanent output loss (see Ranciere, Tornell and Westermann (2008) for an
interesting discussion on the e®ect of crises on long-term growth), they often lead to a
dramatic temporary output loss. The crisis measure we use is derived from the dates for
banking crises provided by Caprio and Klingebiel (2005). Our results are summarized in
Table 7.
The ¯rst exercise we conduct is to simply include the crisis dummy contemporaneously
with the dependent variable in our standard growth regression from Table 1. In Panel A,
the crisis coe±cient indicates the average annual loss in GDP growth during a crisis year.
The estimates are around 1% of GDP per year. The inclusion of this variable does not
signi¯cantly a®ect the coe±cients associated with ¯nancial openness. This is inconsistent
with the critique that ¯nancial liberalizations may take place after a crisis and hence that
the growth e®ect is biased because of the crisis years occurring just before the reforms.
However, it is still possible that ¯nancial openness interacts with crises in other ways.
18The second set of results also includes an interaction e®ect between crises and openness.
Interestingly, the results suggest that the output cost of a crisis is larger in open countries.
The e®ect is largest for capital market openness (estimated to be around 1.5%) but
only borderline signi¯cant. For equity market liberalization, the e®ect is not signi¯cant.
Nevertheless, it does appear that there may be a cost to liberalizations in the form of
larger crises. However, it is important to realize that the temporary output loss due to
crises is outweighed in our sample by the positive growth e®ects of liberalization. A crisis
lasts on average 3.5 years, so the estimate of the total output loss of a crisis in a ¯nancially
open country varies between 6.50% (capital account openness) and 5.88% (equity market
openness). However, the output gain of liberalization is to a certain extent permanent. A
temporary growth spurt after liberalization of about ¯ve years with the per annum e®ects
reported in Table 7 would su±ce to o®set the output loss induced by a crisis.
These results already suggest that many crises happened post-liberalization. A case
in point is the South-East Asian crisis that happened 5 to 6 years after liberalization
in a number of countries. This raises the possibility that liberalizations cause or help
cause crises. In Panel B, we report the results of a panel probit analysis. The left hand
side variable is a dummy variable that takes on the value of one if there is a crisis over
the next ¯ve years. The independent variables are measured at the beginning of the
5-year period. We only include closed or liberalizing countries in this sample, and the
independent variables are the ones employed in the regressions reported in Table 1 plus
the ICRG political risk index.
We ¯nd a number of signi¯cant predictors of a banking sector crisis. First, larger levels
of initial per capita GDP, secondary school enrollment, and life expectancy are all strongly
associated with a reduced probability of a crisis in the capital account speci¯cation, but
in the equity market speci¯cation only initial GDP remains signi¯cant among these vari-
ables. Second, larger scores for ICRG's political risk index (where larger numbers denote
higher levels of safety) are also signi¯cantly associated with reduced crisis probabilities.
The second column provides an interpretation of the economic signi¯cance of the e®ects
by reporting two speci¯c predicted crisis probabilities. In particular, we evaluate all the
variables at their medians except the variable in question, which is evaluated at, respec-
tively, the 25% and 75% percentiles in its overall distribution. Clearly, of the explanatory
19variables discussed so far, economic development, measured using initial GDP per capita,
generates the largest spread in crisis probabilities.
There are two sets of surprising results that are of considerable interest. First, there
is no reliably signi¯cant relationship between ¯nancial openness and the probability of a
banking sector crisis. The point estimates for both measures are negative. For capital
account openness, the coe±cient is more than one standard error below zero. An alterna-
tive way to state the result is that capital controls do not help avert crises. This result is
consistent with Glick and Hutchinson's (2005) analysis of the e®ect of capital controls on
exchange rate stability, ¯nding that, if anything, they appear to increase the vulnerability
of economies to speculative attacks.
Second, there is a signi¯cantly positive relationship between the private credit to GDP
ratio and the probability of a banking sector crisis, which is economically very important
as well.10 In unreported results, we further explore this positive relation. We split up
the private credit to GDP observations into three bins using the full cross-sectional and
time-series distribution: observations below the 25th percentile, between the 25th and
75th percentiles, and observations greater than the 75th percentile. In the lowest private
credit to GDP group, the sign is negative but not signi¯cant. It makes sense that countries
with little or no banking are unlikely to experience a banking crisis. Both the middle
and highest private credit to GDP variables have positive and signi¯cant coe±cients.
Interestingly, the coe±cient on the highest banking intensity is double that of the medium
intensity. This suggests a strong non-linear e®ect. Excessive credit growth may lead to
an increased probability of a crisis.
The current upheaval of global ¯nancial markets and world-wide recession beckons the
blame game and at the top of the list is globalization. Our results provide an alternative
perspective. Financial openness alone is not an important predictor in our crisis prob-
ability model. However, our evidence points to a non-linear role for the size of private
credit. When we re-estimate our model in Table 4 with a quadratic term on private credit
to GDP, it is strongly signi¯cant. As an example, by the end of 2006 Iceland's ratio of
private credit to GDP exceeded 300%, yielding a near 100% probability of crisis in the
10Bon¯glioli (2008) also ¯nds a positive link between private credit to GDP and crises; she also ¯nds
a limited role for ¯nancial liberalization in explaining crises in developed countries.
20next year according to our probit model. Hence, our evidence points to excessive leverage
as the culprit rather than openness. While openness may make it possible to take extreme
bets by ¯nancial institutions employing leverage, policy makers and ¯nancial institutions
can choose more conservative capital structures in a ¯nancially open economy.
6 Conclusions
Our work ¯ts into a growing research area that investigates the link between ¯nancial
openness (both capital account and equity market) and productivity. We dissect growth
into two channels: capital stock growth and total factor productivity growth. In contrast
to the work of Bon¯glioli (2008), we ¯nd that ¯nancial openness positively impacts both of
these channels, but has a greater impact on factor productivity than investment. Hence,
we are able to reconcile the relatively large GDP growth response to ¯nancial openness
and the relatively modest increase in investment. In recent work, Kose et al. (2008) also
¯nd a positive e®ect on productivity. Bon¯glioli (2008) and Kose et al. (2008) also ¯nd
productivity e®ects despite using a coarse measure of capital account openness. We push
the story further, o®ering three additional insights.
First, we investigate whether the growth e®ects are permanent or temporary. The neo-
classical model of growth suggests a temporary e®ect. Our results show both temporary
and permanent e®ects both in the growth of the capital stock and total factor produc-
tivity. We provide some insights into the channels of these permanent e®ects, showing
that ¯nancial openness is associated with future improvements in ¯nancial development,
institutional quality, and macro-economic policies. These results are mostly, but not al-
ways, robust to controlling for simultaneous reforms, but are somewhat sensitive to how
we control for time e®ects. This insight seems particularly germane to policy makers
considering regulatory reforms.
Second, we show that both capital stock and productivity growth display heteroge-
neous e®ects. Intuitively, it does not make sense that all countries respond in the same
fashion to a ¯nancial liberalization { whether in the capital account or the equity market.
Our analysis shows that the initial country-speci¯c characteristics of the ¯nancial sector
and the quality of institutions signi¯cantly drive the size of the growth response in both
21capital stock and factor productivity. The pre-existing environment into which reforms
are introduced is critical.
Finally, we address the currently relevant question of whether ¯nancial liberalization
is worth it if it renders a country more sensitive to banking crises. When we control for
banking crises, the ¯nancial openness e®ect in our growth regression remains robust. This
establishes that recovery from banking crises is not somehow inducing a spurious relation
between openness and growth. More importantly, a panel probit analysis shows that
¯nancial openness does not signi¯cantly in°uence the probability of a banking crisis (and
the point estimates are, in fact, negative). Indeed, our probability of crisis model points
to the leverage that the banking sector employs as a critical determinant of banking
crises. We ¯nd a strong non-linear relation between crisis and the size of the banking
sector. When the level of private credit becomes exceptionally large as compared to GDP
(presumably via leverage), this greatly increases the probability of a crisis. Though our
data only go through December 2006, the probit speci¯cation forecasts a crisis in 2007 in
a number of countries. The model assigns a 100% probability to a crisis in Iceland. The
estimated probabilities in many countries, such as the U.S. and U.K., are also substantially
heightened.
Our work, together with the mounting micro-oriented evidence as in Chari and Henry
(2008), Gupta and Yuan (2009) and Mitton (2006), is consistent with the notion that
¯nancial openness has indeed improved growth prospects for most countries. Ultimately,
¯rm-speci¯c evidence should yield more powerful tests and ¯ner detail on how productivity
is enhanced through openness.
We want to end with an additional \big picture" empirical result. The main reason to
focus on factor productivity growth is Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006)'s observation that
to close the development gap, ¯nancial openness would have to raise factor productivity.
But, what happened to the development gap during our sample period? In Figure 1, we
provide a tantalizing, but depressing answer. We examine the average GDP per capita
(in logs) of four country groups: countries that never opened, liberalizing countries with
a relatively high GDP per capita in 1980, liberalizing countries with a relatively low
GDP per capita, and countries that were already ¯nancially open in 1980. We show the
evolution over time of the ratio of per capita GDP of the always open countries to the
22per capita GDP of the ¯rst three groups. We stratify the liberalizing economies in terms
of initial GDP because, as a group, their development level was higher than that of the
always closed countries.
Figure 1 shows that the income of the low income liberalizing countries is actually lower
than that of the always closed countries. Liberalizing countries as a group have closed
a bit of the gap. On average, the ratio went from 1.51 in 1980 to 1.46 in 2005, where
most of the convergence is actually coming from the lower income countries. However,
the closed countries have diverged: while the open countries were 1.42 times richer in
1980, they are now 1.52 times richer. This evolution also means that liberalization has
in fact contributed to increased cross-sectional dispersion of per capita GDPs, with the
main contributor being the growing divergence between poor, closed countries and open
countries.
We examine the cross-sectional dispersion by estimating the following regression:
Dispt = ®0 + ®
0
1Xt + ´t (5)
where Dispt is the cross-sectional variance of log GDP per capita across all countries for
each year. Xt is a vector of explanatory variables including: the time-series variance of
world GDP growth (taken as a rolling ¯ve-year standard deviation of world GDP growth),
the percentage of countries undergoing a banking crisis in that year, the average level of the
trade to GDP ratio, and the spread between the log per capita GDP levels for countries
that are either fully open or fully closed throughout our sample. Finally, to examine
the role for ¯nancial openness, we include the percentage of countries with either an open
capital account or equity market. Of these potential explanatory variables, only the spread
between GDP per capita for open and closed countries and the level of ¯nancial openness,
using either measure, are statistically signi¯cant. Both e®ects are positive, suggesting
that ¯nancial openness has indeed contributed to higher cross-sectional income dispersion
over time. In sum, in the parlance of the neo-classical growth theory, the globalization
process has led to some level convergence but also to sigma divergence.
In conclusion, our results on the growth e®ects are not uniformly positive. We ¯nd
a near-permanent e®ect of ¯nancial openness on factor productivity, but, so far, income
levels in liberalizing countries are still far removed from industrialized country levels.
23Moreover, the alarming income divergence for the poorest countries poses a huge challenge
for development economics that globalization by itself cannot resolve, especially since we
also document strong threshold e®ects in Section 4.
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Constant -0.2075 -0.1766 -0.1544 -0.2527 -0.2650 -0.1731
(0.0436) (0.0255) (0.0378) (0.0395) (0.0254) (0.0335)
Initial GDP -0.0136 -0.0149 -0.0091 -0.0111 -0.0132 -0.0071
(0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0006)
Secondary School (0.0316) (0.0185) (0.0260) (0.0170) (0.0055) (0.0154)
(0.0041) (0.0021) (0.0040) (0.0030) (0.0020) (0.0030)
Log(Life) 0.0700 0.0663 0.0501 0.0796 0.0875 0.0533
(0.0116) (0.0076) (0.0098) (0.0109) (0.0076) (0.0090)
Trade/GDP 0.0073 0.0075 0.0051 0.0071 0.0083 0.0046
(0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0009)
Private credit/GDP 0.0081 0.0122 0.0045 0.0045 0.0070 0.0024
(0.0022) (0.0027) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0025) (0.0014)
Financial Openness 0.0150 0.0167 0.0099 0.0098 0.0118 0.0063
(0.0031) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0020)
 Contribution to Growth 33.5% 66.4% 36.2% 63.8%
Capital Account Openness Official Equity Market Liberalization
The dependent variables are the overlapping five-year average growth rate of real per capita gross domestic product (GDP), the growth rate of the real capital 
stock, and total factor productivity growth.  In addition to a set of standard control variables and year effects, we report the coefficient on financial openness 
defined as (1) Quinn’s capital account openness indicator that takes a value between zero and one depending upon the intensity of the reported capital account 
openness and (2) the official liberalization indicator that takes a value of one when the equity market is liberalized, and zero otherwise.  Given data limitations, 
the capital account openness regressions include 78 countries and the official equity market liberalization regressions include 96 countries.  The regressions 
cover 1980-2006.  We report coefficient estimates from pooled OLS regressions. All standard errors (in parentheses) provide a correction for cross-sectional 
heteroskedasticity and account for the overlapping nature of the data.  Finally, we include a percentage decomposition of the financial openness effect on GDP 
growth into capital stock accumulation and total factor productivity (it does not sum to 100% due to rounding).  The capital stock component is calculated as 
0.3, the assumed capital share, multiplied by the reported financial openness effect for capital stock growth.  The total factor productivity component is the 
reported financial openness effect in the factor productivity regression.    
 Table 2
Financial Openness and Growth Components: Robustness
GDP growth Capital Stock Growth
Total Factor 
Productivity
Capital Account Openness                     0.0227 0.0123 0.0190
  (Fixed Effects) (0.0037) (0.0023) (0.0038)
Contribution to Growth 16.3% 83.7%
Official Equity Market Liberalization               0.0131 0.0033 0.0122
  (Fixed Effects) (0.0021) (0.0011) (0.0020)
Contribution to Growth 7.5% 92.5%
Equity Market Openness                0.0136 -0.0006 0.0138
  (Fixed Effects) (0.0029) (0.0016) (0.0028)
Contribution to Growth -1.3% 101.3%
Equity Market Openness                                  0.0085 0.0084 0.0060
 (Standard Controls) (0.0021) (0.0018) (0.0019)
Contribution to Growth 29.5% 70.5%
The dependent variables are the overlapping five-year average growth rate of real per capita gross domestic product (GDP), the growth rate 
of the real capital stock, and total factor productivity growth.  We report the coefficient on financial openness defined as (1) Quinn’s capital 
account openness indicator that takes a value between zero and one depending upon the intensity of the reported capital account openness; 
(2) the official liberalization indicator that takes a value of one  when the equity market  is liberalized, and zero otherwise; and (3) an 
alternative measure of the degree of equity market openness (investability).  In this table, we consider robustness of the effects reported in 
Table 1 to specifications that instead include country fixed effects and contemporaneous world  GDP growth.  To explore  robustness to 
alternative measures of financial openness, we also consider the identical specifications employed in Table 1 for equity market openness.  
Given data limitations, the capital account openness regressions include 78 countries and the official equity market liberalization and equity 
market openness regressions include 96 countries. The regressions cover 1980-2006.  We report coefficient estimates from pooled OLS 
regressions. All standard errors (in parentheses) provide a correction for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and account for the overlapping 
nature of the data.  Finally,  we include a percentage decomposition of the financial openness effect on GDP growth into capital stock 
accumulation and total factor productivity.  The capital stock component is calculated as 0.3, the assume capital share, multiplied by  the 
reported financial openness effect for capital stock growth.  The total factor productivity component is the reported financial openness effect 
in the factor productivity regression. 
 Table 3
Financial Openness and Growth Components: Temporary versus Permanent Effects
GDP growth Capital Stock Growth
Total Factor 
Productivity
Capital Account Openness              
(Standard Controls)
Temporary Effect 0.0045 -0.0025 0.0052
(0.0032) (0.0028) (0.0026)
Permanent Effect 0.0125 0.0107 0.0092
(0.0021) (0.0017) (0.0018)
Capital Account Openness                    
(Fixed Effects)
Temporary Effect 0.0160 0.0040 0.0149
(0.0023) (0.0015) (0.0024)
Permanent Effect 0.0167 0.0065 0.0147
(0.0027) (0.0016) (0.0029)
Official Equity Market Liberalziation 
(Standard Controls)
Temporary Effect 0.0139 0.0125 0.0101
(0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0017)
Permanent Effect 0.0079 0.0100 0.0049
(0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0020)
Official Equity Market Liberalization           
(Fixed Effects)
Temporary Effect 0.0158 0.0059 0.0140
(0.0022) (0.0012) (0.0021)
Permanent Effect 0.0148 0.0019 0.0142
(0.0024) (0.0013) (0.0022)
The dependent variables are the overlapping five-year average growth rate of real per capita gross domestic product (GDP), the growth rate 
of the real capital stock, and total factor productivity growth.  We report temporary and permanent effects from financial openness defined 
as the first five years after a liberalization event and the six plus years beyond, respectively.  Fully open countries are associated with the 
permanent effect, and closed countries are associated with neither.  For capital account openness, we define a liberalization event as an 
upward increment of 0.2 or larger in Quinn’s openness measure that results in the measure exceeding 0.5.   For the official  liberalization 
indicator,  the  date  of  liberalization  is  directly  employed.    Given  data  limitations,  the  capital  account  openness  regressions  include  78 
countries and the official equity market liberalization regressions include 96 countries.  The regressions cover 1980-2006.  We report the 
effects with (1) standard controls and time effects and (2) country fixed effects and the contemporaneous world GDP growth rate.  We 
report  coefficient  estimates  from  pooled  OLS  regressions.  All  standard  errors  (in  parentheses) provide  a  correction  for  cross-sectional 
heteroskedasticity and account for the overlapping nature of the data.   
 Table 4
The effect of financial openness on financial development,












Market Illiquidity                                        -0.0573*  -0.0476*  -0.0769*  -0.0463*
(Log Zero Returns) (0.0544) (0.0353) (0.0564) (0.0360)
0.0392 -0.0046
(0.0453) (0.0352)
[45] [47] [45] [47]
Turnover 0.0762* 0.0702* 0.0558* 0.0424*
(0.0416) (0.0295) (0.0423) (0.0294)
0.0428 0.0627
(0.0317) (0.0229)
[56] [60] [55] [59]
MCAP/GDP 0.0925* 0.0380* 0.0631* -0.0098
(0.0592) (0.0301) (0.0582) (0.0270)
0.1190 0.1704
(0.0272) (0.0282)
[65] [72] [61] [67]
Market R
2 (MYY) 0.0900* 0.0455* 0.0936* 0.0433*
(0.0130) (0.0092) (0.0138) (0.0092)
-0.0067 0.0067
(0.0146) (0.0074)
[44] [46] [44] [46]
Banking Development:
Private Credit 0.0951* 0.0535* 0.0748 0.0264
(0.0172) (0.0107) (0.0152) (0.0097)
0.0813 0.1276
(0.0155) (0.0203)
[78] [96] [71] [81]
Institutions / Corporate Governance:
Investment Profile 0.1164* 0.0340* 0.0947*  -0.0082*
(0.0201) (0.0113) (0.0161) (0.0080)
0.0798 0.1154
(0.0201) (0.0183)
[73] [86] [71] [81]
Quality of Institutions 0.0309 0.0187 0.0316 0.0130
(0.0078) (0.0066) (0.0081) (0.0053)
0.0039 0.0363
(0.0097) (0.0085)
[73] [86] [71] [81]
Law and Order 0.0267 0.0267 0.0295 0.0130
(0.0133) (0.0098) (0.0130) (0.0084)
0.0470 0.0710
(0.0138) (0.0153)
[73] [86] [71] [81]
Macro-economic Environment 0.0294* 0.0143* 0.0247* 0.0001*
(0.0092) (0.0048) (0.0086) (0.0039)
0.0371 0.0499
(0.0074) (0.0086)
[73] [86] [71] [81]
Log Country Credit Rating 0.1210* 0.0511* 0.1298* 0.0440*
(0.0275) (0.0146) (0.0273) (0.0136)
0.0635 0.1235
(0.0190) (0.0207)
[74] [86] [71] [81]
The dependent variable is each regression is provided in the left-most column.  The variables of interest are separated into measures of stock market development, 
banking development, and institutions / corporate governance.  We report the coefficient on financial openness defined as (1)  Quinn’s capital account openness 
indicator that takes a value between zero and one depending upon the intensity of the reported capital account openness and (2) the official liberalization indicator that 
takes a value of one when the equity market is liberalized, and zero otherwise.  As controls, we employ the lagged dependent variable, year effects, and in the right-
most columns the predicted probability of capital account or equity liberalization based on panel probit regressions of the relevant financial openness variables onto 
the contemporaneous trade/GDP, private credit/GDP, log country credit ratings, and the quality of institutions variables. For this second set of regressions, we also 
report, for comparison, the coefficient and standard error on this predicted probability of financial  liberalization.   The regressions cover 1980-2006.  All standard 
errors (in parentheses) provide a correction for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and account for the overlapping nature of the data.  Given data limitations, the 
number of countries employed differs and is reported below each estimate (in brackets). An asterisk (*) indicates that the coefficient is statistically significant in the 
alternative regression where time effects are replaced by contemporaneous world GDP growth. Table 5







Global Growth Opportunities -0.0233 -0.0106 -0.0137
(0.0147) (0.0086) (0.0138)
Global Growth Opportunities *               
Capital Account Openness 0.0302 0.0177 0.0277
(0.0111) (0.0091) (0.0107)
Capital Account Openness -0.0007 0.0161 0.0207
(0.0026) (0.0041) (0.0044)
Global Growth Opportunities -0.0153 -0.0072 -0.0061
(0.0112) (0.0061) (0.0108)
Global Growth Opportunities *               
Official Equity Market Liberalization 0.0161 0.0135 0.0175
(0.0077) (0.0054) (0.0086)
Official Equity Market Liberalization 0.0012 -0.0016 0.0076
(0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0029)
The dependent variable is the overlapping five-year average growth rate of real per capita capital stock 
growth.    We  report  the coefficients  on  exogenous growth  opportunities  available  to  each  country, 
financial openness, and their interaction.  In column (1), unreported year effects are also included.  In 
column  (2),  unreported  year  and  country  fixed  effects  are  also  included.    Finally,  in  column  (3) 
unreported year effects and the initial level of GDP are also included.  Financial openness is defined as 
(1) Quinn’s capital account openness indicator that takes a value between zero and one depending 
upon the intensity of the reported capital account openness and (2) the official liberalization indicator 
that  takes  a  value  of  one  when  the  equity  market  is  liberalized,  and  zero  otherwise.    Given  data 
limitations on the exogenous growth opportunities measure, the capital account openness regressions 
include 48 countries and the official equity market liberalization regressions include 50 countries. The 
regressions  cover  1980-2006.    We  report  coefficient  estimates  from  pooled  OLS  regressions.  All 
standard errors (in parentheses) provide a correction for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and account 
for the overlapping nature of the data.  
 Table 6
from low level from high level Direct effect from low level from high level Direct effect # of countries
Financial Sector
Private Credit/GDP 0.0141 0.0188 0.0108 ** 0.0058 0.0135 0.0021 *** 78
(0.0024) (0.0030) (0.0028) (0.0026) (0.0028) (0.0018)
Turnover -0.0010 0.0237 0.0089 *** 0.0048 0.0160 0.0033 *** 66
(0.0035) (0.0039) (0.0022) (0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0017)
MCAP/GDP 0.0143 0.0118 0.0007 0.0090 0.0092 -0.0051 65
(0.0035) (0.0041) (0.0026) (0.0031) (0.0038) (0.0019)
Antidirector rights -0.0031 0.0102 -0.0104 *** 0.0084 0.0091 0.0118 46
(0.0042) (0.0049) (0.0035) (0.0038) (0.0035) (0.0037)
Market R
2 (MYY) 0.0028 -0.0098 -0.0023 *** 0.0090 0.0036 0.0092 * 46
(0.0050) (0.0053) (0.0058) (0.0036) (0.0034) (0.0043)
Quality of Institutions
Quality of Institutions 0.0039 0.0232 0.0090 *** 0.0010 0.0112 0.0193 ** 73
(0.0023) (0.0035) (0.0040) (0.0031) (0.0042) (0.0045)
Investment profile -0.0007 0.0142 0.0356 *** -0.0008 0.0105 0.0134 ** 73
(0.0022) (0.0027) (0.0039) (0.0027) (0.0033) (0.0057)
Law and Order 0.0059 0.0148 0.0177 *** 0.0011 0.0087 0.0161 * 73
(0.0024) (0.0038) (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0041) (0.0030)
Log Country Credit Rating -0.0044 0.0181 0.0169 *** 0.0010 0.0183 0.0025 *** 74
(0.0018) (0.0026) (0.0019) (0.0027) (0.0033) (0.0023)
Heterogeneity of the capital stock and total factor productivity growth effects
Capital Stock Growth Total Factor Productivity
Panel A: Capital Account Openness
For each interaction variable, we separately conduct regressions that have the five-year average growth rate of the real capital stock and total factor productivity growth as the dependent 
variables. We include in the regressions the same control variables presented in Table 1.  We estimate interaction effects between financial openness and the financial sector and quality of 
institutions variables. We report the associated impact of growth from openness for a country with a low level (below the median of the associated interaction variable) and with a high 
level (above the median of the associated interaction variable).  We also allow for a direct effect on growth associated with the interaction variable.  In Panel A, we report the effect where 
financial openness is defined as Quinn’s capital account openness indicator that takes a value between zero and one depending upon the intensity of the reported capital account openness.  
In Panel B, financial openness is defined as the official liberalization indicator that takes a value of one when the equity market is liberalized, and zero otherwise.  Given data limitations, 
the regressions employ varied numbers of countries which are provided in the right-most column. We report coefficient estimates from pooled OLS regressions. The regressions cover 
1980-2006.   All standard errors (in parentheses) provide a correction for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and account for the overlapping nature of the data.  Last, we provide the 
significance of a Wald test, for which the null hypothesis is that the high-low effects are equivalent; statistical significance is denoted by a  * for 10%, ** for 5%, and *** for 1% significance 
levels. Table 6 (continued)
from low level from high level Direct effect from low level from high level Direct effect # of countries
Financial Sector
Private Credit/GDP 0.0100 0.0131 0.0061 * 0.0011 0.0100 -0.0003 *** 96
(0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0028) (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0016)
Turnover 0.0006 0.0119 0.0113 *** 0.0025 0.0078 0.0041 *** 73
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0017)
MCAP/GDP 0.0099 0.0085 0.0005 0.0065 0.0055 -0.0046 73
(0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0025) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Antidirector rights 0.0027 0.0115 -0.0050 *** 0.0071 0.0086 0.0098 47
(0.0025) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0023)
Market R
2 (MYY) 0.0082 -0.0021 -0.0007 *** 0.0049 0.0023 0.0077 * 46
(0.0030) (0.0027) (0.0055) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0043)
Quality of Institutions
Quality of Institutions 0.0083 0.0138 0.0083 ** 0.0018 0.0064 0.0164 86
(0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0041) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0044)
Investment profile 0.0010 0.0149 0.0327 *** -0.0013 0.0086 0.0155 *** 86
(0.0011) (0.0031) (0.0043) (0.0018) (0.0025) (0.0053)
Law and Order 0.0094 0.0115 0.0134 0.0030 0.0062 0.0136 86
(0.0029) (0.0017) (0.0033) (0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0033)
Log Country Credit Rating -0.0042 0.0113 0.0213 *** -0.0027 0.0094 0.0056 *** 73
(0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0018)
Panel B: Official Equity Market Liberalization
Capital Stock Growth Total Factor ProductivityTable 7
Financial Openness and Crises








Banking Crisis -0.0139 -0.0144
(0.0020) (0.0020)
Financial Openness 0.0143 0.0098
(0.0029) (0.0024)
Banking Crisis -0.0072 -0.0133
(0.0058) (0.0025)




Panel B: Does Financial Openness 
Cause Crises? (Panel Probit on 5-year 
Banking Crisis Indicator)
Coefficients
25th / 75th 
Percentiles Coefficients




Initial GDP -0.5558 0.0804 -0.5049 0.0947
(0.2025) 0.0022 (0.1721) 0.0034
Secondary School -1.6592 0.0620 -0.6412 0.0400
(0.5434) 0.0075 (0.4544) 0.0177
Log(Life) 3.7308 0.0086 0.5513 0.0217
(1.3894) 0.0507 (0.9493) 0.0322
Trade/GDP 0.1698 0.0247 -0.0355 0.0289
(0.3087) 0.0289 (0.2756) 0.0279
Private credit/GDP 2.7581 0.0087 2.7493 0.0107
(0.3837) 0.1874 (0.3567) 0.1763
ICRG Political Risk Index -2.0385 0.0434 -2.1009 0.0451
(0.7151) 0.0131 (0.5766) 0.0147
Financial Openness -0.3546 0.0323 -0.0496 0.0285
(0.3010) 0.0214 (0.1287) 0.0254
73 86
Capital Account Openness
Official Equity Market 
Liberalization
In Panel A, the dependent variable is the overlapping five-year average growth rate of real per capita gross domestic product 
(GDP.  The regressions include the set of standard control variables employed in Table 1.  We report the coefficient on financial 
openness defined as (1) Quinn’s capital account openness indicator that takes a value between zero and one depending upon the 
intensity of the reported capital account openness and (2) the official liberalization indicator that takes a value of one when the 
equity market is liberalized, and zero otherwise.  We report the GDP growth effect associated with a contemporaneous banking 
sector crisis as identified by Caprio and Klingebiel, as well as an interaction effect between financial openness and banking 
sector  crises.   Given  data  limitations,  the  capital  account openness  regressions  include  78  countries  and  the  official  equity 
market  liberalization  regressions  include  96  countries.  We  report  coefficient  estimates  from  pooled  OLS  regressions.  The 
regression covers 1980-2006.  All standard errors (in parentheses) provide a correction for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and 
account for the overlapping nature of the data.  In Panel B, the dependent variable in a panel probit estimation is a 0/1 indicator 
measuring the incidence of a banking sector crisis over the subsequent five-years.  We include the standard control variables, the 
ICRG’s measure of political risk, and our two measures of financial openness.  We report both the coefficient estimates and, in 
the second column, a measure of the economic significance of the effects.  In particular, we provide two specific predicted crisis 
probabilities  where  we  evaluate  all  the  variables  at  their  medians  except  the  variable  in  question,  which  is  evaluated  at, 






















































































































Log Per Capita GDP Ratios   
Fully Open / Fully Closed Fully Open / Low Income Liberalizing Fully Open / High Income LiberalizingAppendix Table
Description of the Variables
All data are employed at the annual frequency.
Variable Description
Gross domestic product (GDP) and its 
subcomponents
Real per capita gross domestic product. Available for all countries from 1980 through 2006. Source: World 
Bank Development Indicators.
Capital Stock and Total Factor Productivity (TFP) We build per capita physical capital stocks over the 1980–2006 period using the method in King and Levine 
(1994).  We derive an initial estimate of the capital stock, assuming each country is at its steady state capital-
output ratio at that time. Then, we use the aggregate real investment series and the perpetual inventory 
method with a depreciation rate of 7% to compute the capital stock in later years. TFP is calculated as the 
difference between the GDP growth rate and 0.3 times the capital stock growth rate, assuming a capital 
share of 0.3.
Measures of Financial Openness
Quinn Capital account liberalization indicator Quinn’s capital account openness measure is also created from the text of the annual volume published by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.   Rather than 
the indicator constructed by the IMF that takes a 1 if any restriction is in place, Quinn’s openness measure is 
scored 0-4, in half integer units, with 4 representing a fully open economy.  The measure hence facilitates a 
more nuanced view of capital account openness, and is available for 48 countries in our study.  We 
transform the measure into a 0 to 1 scale.
Official equity market liberalization indicator Corresponding to a date of formal regulatory change after which foreign investors officially have the 
opportunity to invest in domestic equity securities. Official Liberalization dates are based on Bekaert and 
Harvey (2002) A Chronology of Important Financial, Economic and Political Events in Emerging Markets,  
http://www.duke.edu/~charvey/chronology.htm. This chronology is based on over 50 different source 
materials. A condensed version of the chronology, along with the selection of dates for a number of countries 
appears in Bekaert and Harvey (2000).  We have extended their official liberalization dates to include Japan, 
New Zealand, and Spain. For the liberalizing countries, the associated official liberalization indicator takes a 
value of one when the equity market is officially liberalized and thereafter, and zero otherwise.  For the 
remaining countries, fully segmented countries are assumed to have an indicator value of zero, and fully 
liberalized countries are assumed to have an indicator value of one.
Intensity equity market liberalization indicator Following Bekaert (1995) and Edison and Warnock (2003), the intensity measure is based on the ratio of the 
market capitalization of the constituent firms comprising the IFC Investable index to those that comprise the 
IFC Global index for each country.  The IFC Global index, subject to some exclusion restrictions, is designed 
to represent the overall market portfolio for each country, whereas the IFC Investable index is designed to 
represent a portfolio of domestic equities that are available to foreign investors.  A ratio of one means that all 
of the stocks are available to foreign investors.  Fully segmented countries have an intensity measure of zero, 
and fully liberalized countries have an intensity measure of one.
Macroeconomic and demographic measures
Initial GDP Logarithm of real per capita gross domestic product in 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, or 2000 for the subsequent 
five years.  Available for all countries. Source: World Bank Development Indicators.
Secondary School Enrollment Secondary school enrollment ratio is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the 
age group that officially corresponds to the secondary level of education. Accordingly, the reported value can 
exceed (or average) more than 100%. Available for all countries. Source: World Bank Development 
Indicators.
Log life expectancy Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of 
mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life.  Available for all countries. Source: 
World Bank Development Indicators.
Trade/GDP The trade dependency ratio is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of 
gross domestic product. Available for all countries. Source: World Bank Development Indicators.
Private credit/GDP Private credit divided by gross domestic product. Credit to private sector refers to financial resources 
provided to the private sector, such as through loans, purchases of non-equity securities, and trade credits 
and other accounts receivable that establish a claim for repayment.  Available for all countries. Source: 
World Bank Development Indicators.Appendix Table
(Continued)
Variable Description
Illiquidity Following Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999), Lesmond (2005), and Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad 
(2007), we construct the illiquidity measure as the proportion of zero daily returns observed over the 
relevant year for each equity market.  We obtain daily returns data in local currency at the firm level from 
the Datastream research files.  For each country, we observe daily returns (using closing prices) for a large 
collection of firms. The total number of firms available from the Datastream research files accounts for about 
90%, on average, of the number of domestically listed firms reported by the World Bank's World 
Development Indicators.  For each country, we calculate the capitalization-weighted proportion of zero daily 
returns across all firms, and average this proportion over the year. Available for 46 countries.
Equity market turnover The ratio of equity market value traded to the market capitalization.  The data are available for 51 countries. 
Source: Standard and Poor's/International Finance Corporation's Emerging Stock Markets Factbook.
MCAP/GDP The ratio of equity market capitalization to gross domestic product.  The data are available for 51 countries. 
Source: Standard and Poor's/International Finance Corporation's Emerging Stock Markets Factbook.
MYY R
2 synchronicity Equity market synchronicity as developed in Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000). The measure is an annual value-
weighted local market model R
2 obtained from each firm's returns regressed on the local market portfolio 
return for that year. Available for 47 countries.
Investment Profile ICRG political risk sub-component.  This is a measure of the government’s attitude to inward investment.  
The investment profile is determined by PRS's assessment of three sub-components: (i) risk of expropriation 
or contract viability; (ii) payment delays; and (iii) repatriation of profits.  Each sub-component is scored on a 
scale  from zero (very high risk) to four (very low risk).  Source: Various issues of the International 
Country Risk Guide.
Quality of Institutions The sum of the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Political Risk subcomponents: Corruption, Law 
and Order, and Bureaucratic Quality. Source: Various issues of the International Country Risk Guide.
Law and Order ICRG political risk sub-component. ICRG assesses Law and Order separately, with each sub-component 
comprising zero to three points.  The Law sub-component is an assessment of the strength and impartiality 
of the legal system, while the Order sub-component is an assessment of popular observance of the law.  
Thus, a country can enjoy a high rating (3.0) in terms of its judicial system, but a low rating (1.0) if the law 
is ignored for a political aim.  Source: Various issues of the International Country Risk Guide
Macro-economic Environment The value of the the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) economic risk indicator (which ranges 
between 0 and 50).  The risk rating is a combination of 5 subcomponents: GDP levels and growth, 
respectively, inflation, balanced budgets, and the current account.  The minimum number of points for each 
component is zero, while the maximum number of points depends on the fixed weight that component is 
given in the overall economics risk assessment.  Source: Various issues of the International Country Risk 
Guide.
Growth Opportunities Growth opportunities are global measures of country-specific growth opportunities.  Growth Opportunities 
are measured as the log of the inner product of the vector of global industry PE ratios and the vector of 
country-specific industry weights.  Country-specific industry weights are determined by relative equity 
market capitalization.  Then, a 60-month moving average is removed.  Available for 51 countries.  Source: 
Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2007)
Political risk rating The political risk rating indicator which ranges between 0 (high risk) and 100 (low risk).  The risk rating is a 
combination of 12 subcomponents.  Source: Various issues of the International Country Risk Guide.